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Economic, fiscal, and societal 
consequences of population 
aging – looming catastrophe or 
fake news?
Populations around the world are getting older. This is hap-
pening due to a combination of lower fertility rates and 
declines in both infant mortality and premature deaths, 
the latter of which have resulted in longer life spans (1). In 
high-income countries, there are expectations for large in-
creases in the share of the population above age 80.
While the gains in longevity are roundly celebrated for 
good reason, there are policy concerns that come with 
population aging. Many worry about whether society is 
capable of meeting the health care needs of a larger older 
population. At the same time, there are fears of economic 
and fiscal consequences with a smaller share of people at 
traditional working ages (2,3).
However, evidence suggests that many of the common 
macro-level fears about population aging are exaggerated. 
This short text draws on research from the European Ob-
servatory on Health Systems and Policies program on the 
Economics of Healthy & Active Aging to consider some of 
the economic, fiscal, and societal consequences of popu-
lation aging.
HOW WILL POPULATION AGING AFFECT HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING PATTERNS?
In general, the need for health care increases as people age. 
This contributes to concerns that an aging population will 
rapidly accelerate health expenditure growth rates. While 
per person spending does tend to increase with age, there 
are differences in the magnitude of that increase among 
European countries. An average 80-year-old in Hungary 
consumed 16 times more health care in 2015 than the av-
erage 20-year-old, but in Cyprus, this difference was only 
2.7 times (4).
However, even though countries spend on average more 
per person for older people than for young people, pop-
ulation aging is not expected to have a major impact on 
health spending trends in the future. As has always been 
the case historically, prices and technological innovation 
will remain the primary drivers of health spending. Our 
analysis finds that changes in population age structure 
will add less than one additional percentage point to aver-
age annual per person health care expenditure growth be-
tween 2010 and 2060 in the average EU country (Figure 1). 
Population aging is a slow process that occurs too slowly 
to become a major health spending driver.
The academic literature suggests alternative explanations 
for the observed correlation between health spending and 
calendar age. Researchers find that an individual’s proxim-
ity to death or their health status in general can explain 
FIGURE 1. Additional percentage points of growth in per person 
health expenditure due to population aging, European Union 
average, 2015–2060. Source (5). Reproduced with permission 
from the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
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the calendar age and health spending relationship (6-8). 
These factors are naturally important determinants of 
health spending trends regardless of age. Furthermore, 
data also suggest that starting at some advanced age, the 
health care costs associated with dying decline as people 
die at progressively older ages (7,9). As a result, as people 
live longer, it may be that the impact of population aging 
on health spending growth will be even smaller in the fu-
ture than we would otherwise expect.
HOW WILL POPULATION AGING AFFECT THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR’S ABILITY TO FUND HEALTH CARE?
Prevailing metrics fuel a misconception that older people 
are overwhelmingly “dependent” on younger people. The 
most well-known (and misleading) metric is the old-age 
support ratio, which assumes that everyone over a certain 
age (usually age 65) depends on the rest of the adult pop-
ulation for support through their taxes and social contribu-
tions to the public sector. Naturally, there are many peo-
ple over age 65 in formal work and paying taxes, as well 
as many who are below age 65 who are not. Alternative 
support ratio metrics aim to define the dependent popu-
lation more appropriately based on population health or 
disability status or to explicitly compare consumption and 
production patterns rather than simply shares of the pop-
ulation above and below an age threshold (10,11). These 
more refined support ratios suggest that we should not 
anticipate substantial increases in the share of the popula-
tion who is dependent and requiring state support in the 
future. In the United Kingdom, for example, the tradition-
al old-age support ratio is expected to increase from 27% 
(2005–10) to 41% (2045–50). However, the share of the 
adult population who is disabled is projected to remain 
constant over time at around 10%.
It is important to move even further beyond old-age sup-
port ratios to have a clearer sense of how population aging 
affects public sector finances. In European countries, the 
main sources of public sector revenues are income taxes, 
goods and services taxes, property taxes, and social contri-
butions (12). Each of these is likely to be affected by chang-
ing age-demographics.
Simulations allow us to quantify precisely how population 
aging can affect public sector revenues. Population data 
from Japan, a country with a large older population that 
is increasingly entering retirement, suggest that relying 
on labor markets (ie, social contributions) to raise pub-
lic sector revenues and pay for health and other ser-
vices will lead to fewer public revenues per person over 
time (13). Other forms of taxation, such as taxes on goods 
and services or income taxes, appear to be impervious to 
changing age-demographics (Figure 2).
This can have important implications for health financing, 
especially in settings that rely heavily on labor market con-
tributions for funding. Possible policy options to address 
this challenge include increasing labor market participa-
tion at older ages; increasing social contribution rates; and 
diversifying the mix of revenue sources that are used to fi-
nance health. However, in health systems that depend on 
social contributions there appears to be no simple solu-
tion to keep stable revenues. Diversifying funding toward 
revenue sources that are less affected by population aging 
may help somewhat. However, a combination of re-priori-
tization of public sector budgets in favor of health and in-
creased rates of taxation will likely be needed to maintain 
adequate, stable revenues for the health sector (13).
HOW WILL POPULATION AGING AFFECT FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL WORK?
While population aging will in all likelihood alter economic 
behaviors that have consequences for public sector and 
health sector revenues, as discussed above, there remains 
great scope for older people to contribute to society and 
to the economy, especially if they can remain healthy and 
active. Many people remain in paid work at older ages (14). 
Labor productivity may change to varying degrees for dif-
ferent types of work as people age; for example, jobs that 
are not so physically demanding may see productivity in-
FIGURE 2. Changes in per person tax and social contribu-
tions as the Japanese population ages (index 2015 = 100), 
2015-2060. Source (13). Reproduced with permission from the 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
191Cylus et al: Economic, fiscal, and societal consequences of population ageing
www.cmj.hr
crease alongside more years of experience. In fact, even 
without distinguishing between jobs that require con-
siderable physical exertion and those that do not, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that on average many people have 
considerable health capacity to continue to work at older 
ages (15,16).
A key question therefore is whether many older people 
are already contributing to the economy and society in 
unrecognized ways. For example, informal caregiving is 
commonly done by older people. If informal carers were 
accounted for in the same way as paid workers in national 
employment statistics, there would be a considerable in-
crease in the employment rates for older people, which 
may to some extent alter ageist perceptions that older peo-
ple do not contribute sufficiently to society. In Portugal, ac-
counting for informal carers as any other job would result 
in an almost 13 percentage point increase in employment 
rates among those over 55 (Figure 3). Put another way, one 
study from Spain estimates the economic value of informal 
care being in excess of 2% of GDP (17).
CONCLUSION: HOW SHOULD DECISION-MAKERS 
RESPOND TO POPULATION AGING?
This text finds that alarmist viewpoints suggesting that 
population aging will lead to untenable fiscal pressures 
and that it will erode the welfare state are overblown, if not 
simply false. Particularly from a health system’s perspec-
tive, population aging will not lead to exorbitant expen-
diture growth, though it may require a re-think in some 
countries about the most appropriate and sustainable 
funding mechanisms and how best to organize services. 
At the same time, a careful look at the data confirms that 
older people – particularly those who are healthy and can 
remain active – provide a number of readily quantifiable 
benefits that are often overlooked by common metrics 
and national statistics.
Even if aging does not pose an existential threat, there re-
mains great scope for policy interventions to ensure popu-
lation aging is a boon, rather than bust. Without a doubt, 
policies that support the health and functional capacity 
of older people are essential, both because of the eco-
nomic gains associated with good health through lower 
care costs and greater work potential, as well as because 
of the intrinsic value of good health. Political debates on 
whether and how to support the health and activity of 
older people should carefully consider the evidence on 
the probable costs as well as the benefits that come with 
healthy and active population aging.
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